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Advancement in wireless sensor network (WSN) technology makes it more attractive technology to be adopted in real world
applications including home and industrial automation and e-health or infrastructure monitoring. However the mobility
consideration in these applications makes the security requirements an essential and challenging task. Tomake the communication
secure and the network robust against attacks, a proper key management scheme should be used. This paper presents a secure
online key establishment and authentication scheme for mobility supported heterogeneous sensor networks. The performance
evaluation of the proposed scheme is done using OMNET++ simulator while AVISPA tool is used to validate the security of the
proposed scheme. It is clear from the obtained results that the proposed scheme provides better network connectivity at a low cost
of memory occupation and communication overhead during the authentication and key establishment phases while improving its
network resilience against attacks.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) contain a large number
of small and resource constrained devices. They have lim-
ited computational power, communication range, and mem-
ory/storage capabilities. However their low cost and easily
adopted nature in various environments make them suitable
to be used in home and industrial automation, environmental
monitoring, and e-health and military applications. The
deployment of WSNs can be in a controlled environment
(e.g., home/industry) or in uncontrolled areas (e.g., public
spaces/hilly areas).
Since WSNs have resource limitation characteristics in
terms of available bandwidth and communication range
and have self-organizing and reconfiguration capabilities,
they may introduce many challenges with respect to secure
communication. In order to achieve a certain level of security,
proper security measures must be taken to protect the
network against possible attacks. Resource limited nature
of WSNs becomes an important hurdle in the adoption of
traditional security approaches. Therefore, a completely new
mechanism to secure WSNs needs to be defined which suits
its constrained nature. As cryptography plays an important
role in secure communication, a proper key management
should be considered.
A number of key management schemes have been pro-
posed in the literature. Initially asymmetric cryptography
and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) were considered an
expensive solution to the sensor applications due to their
high computational cost, energy consumption, and storage
requirements. However, research in [1, 2] showed that ECC
(having low computational cost and small key size) and
Rabin’s scheme (supporting fast encryption/decryption time
compared to RSA) can be used for sensor networks.
Wireless sensor networks can be divided into homoge-
neous sensor networks and heterogeneous sensor networks.
Homogeneous sensor networks consist of nodes having the
same capabilities and have been the first choice for the
researchers for developing the security algorithms. But the
studies of [3, 4] showed that these networks have scalability
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issues and performance limitations which have been proved
by both theoretical [5] and simulation analyses [4]. These
limitations open the door for developing heterogeneous
sensor networks (HSNs) consisting of a number of different
nodes having different varying capabilities [6]. For instance,
energy and link heterogeneity inHSNs have been proposed to
increase throughput and network life timewithout increasing
the cost by Yarvis et al. [7] while the energy consumption and
network life time have been analyzed by proposing a periodic
data transmission from sensing field to remote receiver in [8].
In this paper, we propose a secure online authentication
and key establishment and management approach for HSNs.
The objective of this paper is not only to increase the
network life by reducing the energy consumption with the
help of optimized message exchanged pattern during the
authentication phase and key establishment phase but also
to provide better network connectivity and resilience against
attacks compared to the existing approaches. The paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature
review while the proposed scheme is discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the security validation of the proposed
scheme using AVISPA tool against some well-known attacks
while the performance evaluation using OMNET++ simula-
tor is performed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Related Work
Here we present a brief overview of some of the existing
well-known key management schemes proposed for the
heterogeneous WSNs and homogeneous WSNs. Basically
the key management schemes have been divided into two
broad categories: (1) centralized approach and (2) distributed
approach. In the centralized approach, a more powerful node
(base station) is responsible for holding and managing the
secret keys. Public key cryptography is a well-known example
of the centralized approach.However the public key approach
does not suit the resource constrained WSNs. However to
adopt the centralized approach, a centralized keying scheme
has been presented by Perrig et al. [9] called SPINS, where
each node is assigned a secret key while its corresponding
key is kept at the network controlling entity. However the key
release mechanism consists of one-way hash chain and epoch
delay for the authentication purpose in broadcast scenario.
Hence there is no common key between any two nodes and
base station or network controlling entity plays an important
role in establishing a key between the two communicating
nodes. For instance, node 𝑥 and node𝑦want to communicate
with each other. Node 𝑥 sends a request to node 𝑦 which
will be forwarded to base station by node 𝑦. The base station
generates a secret key for 𝑥 and 𝑦. The base station encrypts
it with the secret keys that it shares with 𝑥 and 𝑦. Since base
station acts as trusted server to establish a secret key, the
scheme will fail if the base station fails.
In the distributed approach, each node is assigned secret
key(s) before the network deployment and the nodes use
those keys for secure communication with each other.
Symmetric key approach is one of the best examples of
distributed key approaches. However this approach occupies
lot of memory especially in large network scenario. To reduce
this memory cost, a random key predistribution scheme
has been proposed in [10] which does not require trusted
authority for establishing a key between any two nodes of
the network. In this scheme, each node is assigned a set of
randomly selected keys called a key pool from a large pool
before the network deployment. For secure communication,
two nodes directly share their assigned keys identity with
each other to find a common secret communication key.
However to make this scheme more secure, Chan et al. [11]
introduced the “𝑞-keys” concept. According to this scheme,
the two communicating nodes must share at least 𝑞-keys for
establishing a secret communication key. But this scheme has
a large memory cost in storing a large number of keys in each
node. To improve the network performance and connectivity,
Liu et al. [1] presented a key establishment scheme based
on the deployment knowledge of the nodes in a network
coupled with Rabin’s scheme [12] to make it resilient against
attacks. A pairwise key predistribution scheme called NPKPS
is presented by Zhang et al. [13] to achieve better security,
network connectivity, and less memory cost.
For heterogeneous sensor networks, an unbalanced key
management scheme was proposed by Du et al. [14] to
increase network connectivity, reduce memory cost, and
increase the network resilience compared with balanced key
predistribution approaches. In this scheme, network consists
of high capability nodes assigned 𝑚 keys and low capability
nodes assigned 𝑙 keys such that𝑚 ≫ 𝑙. To further reduce the
memory cost while keeping the security level constant, two-
key pool approach was proposed by Khan et al. [15] for secret
key generation. A combinatorial design for key distribution
is presented by C¸amtepe and Yener [16] while the finite
projective plane (FPP) design is presented by Sa´nchez and
Baldus [17] to distribute polynomial shares. This approach
makes it possible to establish a direct pairwise key for a
large number of nodes without considering their physical
connectivity in the network. To support mobility in WSNs,
Maerien et al. [18] presented the management of secret keys
protocol in which each node is assigned only one symmetric
key shared with its server.
A group-based key management scheme was presented
by J. Zhang and L. Zhang [19] for heterogeneous sensor
networks in which a large number of keys are divided
into small groups of keys while each small key-group is
assigned to each group of nodes or cluster while Du et
al. [2] presented an elliptic curve-based routing driven key
management scheme for sensor networks. Results show that
elliptic curve approach provides better network resilience
against attacks and better network connectivity than the key
predistribution approaches. However key predistribution or
symmetric key distribution based on PKI approach provides
low memory cost and better resilience against attacks [20] if
their deployment location is known in advance. To support
nodemobility in key predistribution approaches, efficient key
management schemes were proposed in [21, 22], which not
only increase the security level but also reduce the memory
cost and computational overhead. Kyeong and Ramakrishna
[23] proposed a level-based key management scheme for
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mobility supported sensor networks for multicast commu-
nication while Chuang et al. [24] proposed two-layered
dynamic key management scheme for mobility supported
networks and Blundo et al. [25] presented a polynomial-
based key predistribution scheme.
The online key generation approach is good for large
WSNs. This saves the memory cost of each node, but it
consumes some energy in generating the secret key. Since the
keys are not stored in eachnode, it has highnetwork resilience
against node compromise attacks as compared to previously
described approaches. One of the online key generation
approaches for cluster-based sensor network is presented in
[26] which provides better network resilience and has low
memory cost while another online key generation approach is
presented in [27] where each node is assigned small number
of generation keys for online key generation. In this approach,
two communicating nodes contact their network manager
or cluster head to discover a shared generation key between
them for secret key generation. Node addition and revocation
capability were introduced by Poornima and Amberker [28]
in a tree-based key management scheme while unpredictable
software-based attestation solution (USAS) is presented in
[29] to detect the compromised node in the network.
Zhang et al. in [30] proposed randomperturbation-based
scheme for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks
in which nodes establish secret key with each other without
revealing their secret to each other.The basis of this scheme is
[25]. However noninteractive pairwise key establishment was
proposed for sensor networks that provides high resilience
and network connectivity.
3. Proposed Scheme
The focus of the proposed scheme is to generate mutual
authentication key and mutual secret key in runtime. The
network architecture of the proposed scheme is based on
heterogeneous sensor networks. However three different
types of nodes are selected for the proposed scheme: (1) base
station (BS), (2) fixed nodes (FNs), and (3) mobile nodes
(MNs). The capabilities of these nodes differ in terms of
computational power, memory space, and energy resources
while the communication of all nodes is kept constant to
ensure one-hop communication links. The base station and
the fixed nodes are made powerful nodes to manage the net-
works and are also provided with tamper-resistant hardware,
while the mobile nodes are considered less powerful nodes
whose function is to gather the information and forward it
to the BS through FNs. Here the mobility is introduced by
making the MNs mobile that change their positions in the
network according to the specificmobilitymodel (mentioned
in Section 5). Each type of nodes has different functionality
and is given different task in generation of secret keys. The
functional block diagram of each type of node is shown in
Figure 1.
It is clear from the functional block that base station
communicates with only fixed nodes while mobile nodes
communicate only with the fixed nodes as well. Hence the
base station acts as a trusted server for the fixed nodes while
the fixed nodes act as trusted server for the mobile nodes.
Base 
station Fix node
Authentication key 
generation algorithm g()
Secret key generation 
algorithm f()
Data collection from 
mobile nodes, processing 
and forwarding to base 
station
Network management, 
nodes monitoring, and secret 
key assignments
Figure 1: Functional block diagram of base station and fixed node.
In addition, cluster-based network architecture is adopted
in which each fixed node acts as a cluster head. In the next
subsections, we describe the proposed key generation algo-
rithm, key predistribution, and proposed cluster formation
approach followed by authentication and key establishment
phases.
3.1. Key Generation Algorithm. Basically we are using two
different types of keys: (1) authentication key and (2) secret
communication key. Using some input parameters and key
generation algorithms generates these two keys. The BS has
the knowledge of all those input parameters and generation
algorithms.The authentication key (𝐾auth) is generated using
𝐾auth = 𝑔 (FNPNS; random number; SKG) , (1)
where 𝑔(⋅) is an authentication key generation function,
FNPNS is fixed nodes prime number sum, and SKG is a secret
key generation code while the secret key (SK) is generated
using
Secret key = 𝑓 (PN
1
;PN
2
;MNPN; SKG) , (2)
where 𝑓(⋅) is a secret key generation function, MNPN is
a mobile node prime number, PN
1
is a generated prime
number-1, and PN
2
is a generated prime number-2. BS dis-
tributes the generated authentication key and the secret key
among the deployed nodes of the network to secure network
against attacks. The distribution of these authentication keys
and secret keys are discussed in the next subsection.
3.2. Key Predistribution. After the generation of the authen-
tication key and the secret key, BS assigns the authentication
key (𝐾auth) and the secret key (SK) to eachMN along with the
network public key𝐾plc before the network deployment. Each
MN is also assigned sum of the prime numbers of fixed nodes
(FNPNS), a prime number (MNPN), and a random number
used in generating the authentication key.
In order to make the fixed nodes a trusted server for
the mobile nodes and to enable their secure communication
with both base station and mobile nodes, they are provided
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Base station Fix node Mobile node
Secret key generator
Authentication key 
generator
Prime number 
generator
Network 
public/private key
Base station 
public/private key
Secret key generator
Authentication key 
generator
Prime number 
generator
Network private key
Base station public 
key
Secret key
Authentication key
FNPNS, RN, and
Network public key
Compromised node 
detection key
Compromised node 
detection key
MNPN
Figure 2: Predistribution of key materials to each node.
with the public/private key pair, base station’s public key,
authentication key generation function 𝑔(⋅), compromised
node detection key (CNDK), secret key generator (SKG),
secret key generation function 𝑓(⋅), and network private
key (𝐾prt) along with a prime number. Figure 2 shows the
predistribution of key materials to each node.
3.3. Cluster Formation. Once the network is deployed, each
fixed node broadcasts Hello messages to know about its
member mobile nodes. However the broadcast attempts
are limited in the proposed scheme (e.g., 3 times during
simulation in the proposed scheme) in order to advertise
their presence to neighboring MNs. The FNs discovery is
thus passively performed by theMNs: this approach has been
selected to limit the messages exchange overhead since it is
expected that the number of FNs is lower than the number of
MNs. Such Hello messages have node IDs and a nonce (used
for authentication purpose) encrypted by 𝑘prt. To make the
network connected, the FNs are deployed in such a way that
each mobile node receives Hello messages from more than
one fixed node.TheMNcan then select a given FN as relevant
CH depending on Hello message signal strength. This helps
each MN to create a list of its neighboring fixed nodes. A
mobile node in handover scenario uses this list. In case the
mobile node does not receive any fixed node Hello message
within the specified interval of time, it starts broadcasting
its own Hello messages to discover its neighboring fixed
nodes. These messages include a nonce encrypted by 𝑘plc
(see Section 4.1 for an explanation of why this approach
counteracts denial of service attacks). Figure 3 describes the
assumed virtual network organization.
3.4. Authentication Phase. Both the CHs and the MNs need
to authenticate each other during the network initialization
phase.The network public/private key pair is used to authen-
ticate that the CH authentication key assigned to each MN
is used in the authentication of each MN with the help of
key generation algorithm assigned to each CH. Furthermore,
mobile node encrypts the joining request using the network
public key and sends it to the CH. This joining request
includes a random number, the FNPNS, received nonce from
CH during cluster formation phase, and encrypted prime
number using the authentication key. After receiving this
BS
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MNMN
MN
MN
MNMN
MN
FN FN FN
FNFNFN
FN FN FN
Cluster
Figure 3: Virtual network topology.
information, CH generates the authentication key of the MN
using key generation function 𝑔(⋅).
Once the CH successfully generates the authentication
key, it decrypts the received encrypted nonce to verify the
authenticity of the MN. Successful decryption provides the
CH with the MN’s prime number. The obtained prime
number will be used in generating the secret key for that
particular MN. As a next step, the CH generates the network
authentication code (NAC) for the successfully authenticated
MN and sends it back with the joining confirmationmessage.
The NAC is a combination of BS prime number and FNs
prime number with the addition of the MN ID (i.e., NAC =
ℎ(BS PrimeNumber, FNs PrimeNumber,MN ID), where ℎ(⋅)
is a one-way hashing function). This approach reduces the
authentication overhead during the handover phase of a MN
from one cluster to other clusters within the same network.
However to protect the NAC from unauthorized access or
attacks, it is periodically updated. As mentioned previously,
each CH is assigned a fast key revocation algorithm [31]
to protect the assigned materials for authentication key
generation and secret key generation.
3.5. Key Establishment andManagement. Before the network
deployment and initialization phase, each MN is assigned a
secret key for secure communication with its CH while the
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CH is provided only with the key generation algorithm. The
CH received the required information for secret key genera-
tion from the MN during the authentication phase (e.g., MN
prime number). The CH uses the received information and
secret key generator to generate the first component as first
prime number (PN
1
) of the secret key. This generated PN
1
is
used to generate a second prime number (PN
2
) with the help
of received prime number and SKG. After the generation of
PN
1
and PN
2
, the CH generates the secret key of the joining
MN for secure communication using key generation function
𝑓(⋅). This generated secret key will be the same secret key
assigned to the MN before the network deployment.
Since the MNs are movable and need to communicate
with each other as well, there must be a secret key for
secure communication among the MNs. This is achieved
by generating a secret key for any pair of MNs through
their CH. Here it is assumed that the two MNs belong
to the same cluster. For instance, a secret key for secure
communication between the mobile node 𝐴 and the mobile
node 𝐵 is generated using their identities IDA and IDB, the
prime numbers of each MN received by the CH during the
authentication phase, and secret key generation function𝑓(⋅).
Once the key is generated, CH encrypts it with the key that it
uses for secure communication with the MN and sends it to
both the MNs separately.
3.6. Mobile Node Handover. The network is deployed such
that each MN receives Hello messages from more than one
FN during the cluster formation phase. The selection of CH
is based on its signal strength. During the movement of
a MN, each MN periodically checks the signal strength of
its cluster head which is not compulsory in case of static
networks. This helps the MN to remain connected in the
network. Once the MN detects that its signal strength drops
below a predefined threshold value, it starts searching for new
CH by broadcasting its own Hello messages. In response to
those Hello messages, the MN will update its neighboring
FNs list and will select the FNwith the highest signal strength
as its new CH at that particular instant. After the selection
of new CH, the MN sends a leaving message to its old CH
and a joining request to the new CH. The leaving message
includes the new CH ID while the joining message includes
the NAC for the authentication purpose. Once the NAC
is authenticated, the new CH will get the joining MN’s
prime number from its previous CH using the secure link
established among the CHs during the network initialization
phase. After receiving the MN’s prime number, the new CH
generates the secret key of that MN. Both CHs then update
their member MNs table and send the updated table to the
BS to avoid node replication attacks.
4. Security Analysis
Since cryptography is considered as the main building block
of any security primitive, the cryptographic keys should also
be secured and authentic. To this aim, the key management
scheme should be secure and each node of the network
should be able to authenticate the cryptographic key(s). This
is the most challenging problem in the considered resource
Table 1: AVISPA simulation results.
Technique Summary
OFMC Safe
CL-AtSe Safe
constrained networks. In order to validate the secrecy of
the proposed key management scheme for heterogeneous
sensor networks, we used theAVISPA (AutomatedValidation
of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool [32].
AVISPA is a push-button tool for the automated validation
of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications. It
provides a modular and expressive formal language for spec-
ifying protocols and their security properties and integrates
different back ends that implement a variety of state-of-the-
art automatic analysis techniques (e.g., OFMC, ATSE, etc.).
We implemented the proposed key management scheme
in AVISPA and checked its security using some of the
attacks provided by AVISPA, namely, OFMC (on-the-fly
model checker) and CL-AtSe (constraint-logic-based attack
searcher). The former builds the infinite tree defined by the
protocol analysis problem in a demand-driven way, that is,
on-the-fly, and uses a number of symbolic techniques to rep-
resent the state space. The latter provides a translation from
any security protocol specification written as a transition
relation into a set of constraints which can be effectively used
to find attacks on protocols. Both translation and checking are
fully automatic and internally performed by CL-AtSe; that is,
no external tool is used. In this approach, each protocol step
is modeled by constraints on the adversary knowledge.These
results are shown in Table 1.
We evaluated the behavior of the proposed scheme when
exposed to some well-known attacks including man-in-the-
middle attacks (used to launch replay attacks, wormhole
attacks, and denial of service attacks), node replication
attacks, and Sybil attacks.
4.1. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. The man-in-the-middle
attack is common and easy to be implemented in WSNs
where the deployment is not secure and can be accessed
by an attacker easily. This attack can be used to launch
other attacks such as replay attacks (denial of service (DoS)
attacks), wormhole attacks, and black hole attacks. First
we describe the effect of replay attacks used to launch DoS
attacks followed by wormhole attacks.
4.1.1. Denial of Service Attacks. The denial of service (DoS)
attacks are used to degrade the performance of a network by
exhausting its resources, such as bandwidth, memory, or pro-
cessor time, for example, by sending fake network topology
and routing information.DoS attacks in the proposed scheme
might be performed during (1) the cluster formation phase,
(2) the MN transition phase from one cluster to another, and
(3) the addition of new nodes in the network.
During the cluster formation phase, all FNs periodically
broadcast Hello messages for a specific number of times
(3 times in the proposed scheme) and each Hello message
is encrypted by the network private key. If an intruder
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Table 2: DoS attack evaluation.
Total number of
attacking nodes
Total Hello messages
sent by the attacker
Total received Hello
messages from
attacker
1 4844 16
2 9267 67
3 14044 174
broadcasts its ownHellomessages, thosemessages will not be
decrypted by the network public key and would be discarded
by the MNs of the network. Also the MNs check how many
Hello messages they received from a specific FN. If those
messages are above a predefined threshold, theMNs consider
FN as an adversary or malicious node of the network.
We implemented a DoS attack by replaying the FNs Hello
messages in the OMNET++ simulator and we have analysed
the performance of the proposed scheme by introducing a
different number of attacking nodes. In the evaluated DoS
scenario, the attacker captures the Hello messages of the FNs
and forwards it to the MNs by changing the source node
ID of the packet. We have analyzed how many modified
Hellomessages are received byMNs from the attacker. Table 2
shows the results of the simulation with 200MNs and 16 FNs
and different number of attacking nodes.
In the resulting simulation scenarios, we change the
attacking node ID during the simulation. This is important
because of random positioning of nodes in the networks
and their effects on the neighboring nodes. Hence each
node of the network acts as an attacker for short time.
When the attacking node changes its ID, the FNs again start
broadcastingHellomessages towards their neighboringMNs.
The changing of ID is sequential and for a specific time (in the
proposed scenario, it is 10 seconds).
During the MNs transition from one cluster to another
cluster, eachMNbroadcasts Hellomessages to know about its
neighboring FNs. Since, in the proposed scheme, these Hello
messages also include the NAC (network authentication
code) which is used by the FNs of the network to authenticate
the incoming MN, the adversary would not be able to send
the correct NAC to the FNs and would be detected at its
first broadcast. The adversary can also add a fake node in the
network to try to get access to the network by broadcasting a
Hello message to know about its neighboring FNs. But since
in the proposed scheme the BS informs the FNs about the
addition of a new MN, its ID, and a specific authentication
code assigned to that MN, the adversary fake node would not
be able to authenticate itself to the FNs andwould be detected
at its first broadcast. Thus the proposed scheme effectively
avoids these three different types of DoS attacks that could
be launched by an adversary at any stage of the network and
could exhaust the resources of both the FNs and the MNs.
4.1.2.WormholeAttack. In thewormhole attack, an adversary
launches twonodes in two different clusters, connecting them
using a direct communication link called wormhole link.
This link could be an Ethernet cable, long-range wireless
transmission, or an optical link. The main purpose of this
attack is to capture the traffic of one part of the network
and replay it in the other parts of the network. Also this
attack is easily implemented in multihop networks. This
attack can be launched against the proposed scheme during
the initialization phase by replaying the Hello messages of
one part of the FNs of the network into another part of the
network to attract the MN communications. However in this
type of attack, the attacker acts as a man-in-the-middle and
just forwards the packets from one part of the network to
the other but would not be able to understand or extract
the key/data information from the received packets. The
verification of this man-in-the-middle attack was performed
using the AVISPA tool which verified the security of the
proposed scheme as shown in Table 1. Note that we use a
single hop network topology approach in which each MN is
only one hop away from the FNs.The FNs send their member
MN lists to the BS and the BS knows the location and position
of each cluster of the network, so this wormhole attack, if
launched after the network initialization phase, can be easily
detected and avoided in the network by the BS.The adversary
node in one cluster cannot pretend to be a member node of
another cluster (even of neighboring cluster) despite having
updated information received by the BS from the FNs.
4.2. Node Replication Attacks. TheMNs are more vulnerable
than the FNs and can be easily captured, analyzed, and
replicated by the attacker in various positions of the network.
Such attacksmay allow the adversary to corrupt data andmay
disconnect a significant part of the network. Node replication
attack might be possible (1) during the network initialization
phase and (2) after the network initialization phase. However
node replication in the network initialization phase is difficult
for an attacker because of the secure deployment phase.
The attacker can launch the node replication attack after
the network initialization phase when the network will no
longer be under observation by the network deployer. Since
in the proposed scheme the MNs communicate directly with
their selected FNs/CHs, each FN sends its MN member
IDs to the BS after the initialization phase. Also, during the
transition phase of a MN from one cluster to another cluster,
the new CH verifies the transition of the incoming MN
from its previous CH. Thus the BS immediately detects node
replication in the network during the initialization phase or
by the FNs during the handover phase of the MNs. Thus
the proposed scheme avoids node replication attacks in the
network.
4.3. Sybil Attack. In the Sybil attack, a malicious/attacker
node assumes multiple identities to launch attacks against
storage space of its neighboring node or some protocol
specific attacks (e.g., routing algorithms). This attack is
reactively successful against key predistributionmechanisms,
but since the proposed scheme uses an online authentication
key and secret key generation technique that involves the
node ID and its unique prime number, it makes it difficult
for an attacker to launch Sybil attack. For example, in other
key predistribution approaches, if an attacker compromises a
few nodes and obtains a few authentic keys of the network,
it can launch Sybil nodes with different IDs and can assign
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7
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Figure 4: Probability of successfully generated Sybil nodes.
them those compromised keys. Now when the verification
and authentication process starts for some authentic nodes
of the network, the Sybil nodes can give them a proof of
authenticity by sending their own key pool IDs along with
the compromised key IDs. If the verifier node and the Sybil
node have a common key among their key pool (i.e., the
key ID and the actual key are the same), the verifier node
would not be able to detect the Sybil node. Otherwise if the
key IDs match but the keys do not match, then the verifier
node can detect such Sybil nodes in the verification process.
But in the proposed scheme there is no concept of initial
secret key predistribution and all the predistributed keys are
the function of the node IDs and their assigned secret prime
number. Hence node compromise does not help the attacker
to launch Sybil nodes with fake IDs.
In the key predistribution approach [33], if every node is
assigned “𝑘” keys from a key pool of size “𝑚” and “𝑑” verifiers
are used to verify a node, and if an attacker compromises “𝑐”
nodes to create a compromised key pool of size “𝑛,” then the
probability of a Sybil node to be successful is
Probability =
𝑘
∑
𝑡=1
(
𝑛
𝑡 ) (
𝑚−𝑛
𝑘−𝑡
)
(
𝑚
𝑘
)
(
(
𝑚−𝑘+𝑡
𝑘
)
(
𝑚
𝑘
)
)
𝑑
. (3)
Figure 4 shows the probability of successfully generated
Sybil nodes in the proposed scheme compared with scheme
[33].
5. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed using
the OMNET++ simulator, in terms of network connectiv-
ity, network resilience against node capture attacks, energy
consumption, memory cost, and communication overhead.
Its security validation is done using the AVISPA tool. The
simulation results have been obtained using OMNET++
4.1 with the mobility framework MiXiM 2.0.1. A network
composed of 500 MNs and 16 FNs defines the simulation
scenario. The size of the network simulation area is 400m ×
400m. Both the FNs and the MNs use the 802.15.4 CSMA
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Figure 5: Probability of sharing at least one common key (connec-
tivity).
and radio specification based on the CC2420 radio chip. The
transmission power is set to 10mWand the sensitivity is set to
−95 dBm for all nodes. The random walk mobility model in
which the speed of theMNs is constant describes themobility
of the MNs, but a random direction (within a predefined
range) is chosen periodically. More specifically, the speed
of the MNs is set to 1m/s (i.e., human walking speed)
and their direction update interval to 0.1 s. The simulations
were repeated 3 times for 5000 seconds for each considered
scenario.
5.1. Network Connectivity. In order to show the effectiveness
of the proposed solution in terms of network connectivity,
the simulation results of the proposed scheme are compared
with [10, 14, 15, 19] where the connectivity depends on the
key sharing probability. For a balanced key predistribution
scheme, the single key sharing probability between the MN
and the FN is given by
Pr [Conn] = 1 − (𝑃 − 𝐾)! (𝑃 − 𝐾)!
𝑃! (𝑃 − 2𝐾)!
, (4)
where𝐾 is the number of keys assigned to FNs andMNs from
a pool of 𝑃 keys. Instead, for the unbalanced key predistri-
bution schemes [14, 15], the single key sharing probability is
given by
Pr [Conn] = 1 − (𝑃 − 𝐾)! (𝑃 − 𝑆)!
𝑃! (𝑃 − 𝑆 − 𝐾)!
, (5)
where 𝐾 is the size of the key pool assigned to each MN and
𝑆 (𝑆 ≫ 𝐾) is the size of the key pool assigned to each FN. In
the proposed scheme, the𝐾plc is assigned to eachMN and the
𝐾prt to each FN before network deployment. These two keys
allow connecting a MN to an authentic FN of the network.
Hence the connectivity of the network is almost 100% if
and only if the FN is not compromised. Figure 5 shows the
comparison of OMNET++ simulation results for the network
connectivity of the schemes proposed in [10, 14, 15, 19].
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Table 3: Memory cost.
Scheme 80% network connectivity 90% network connectivity
No. of keys Key length (bits) Memory used (bits) No. of keys Key length (bits) Memory used (bits)
Proposed 2 160 320 2 160 320
Sarmad 20 160 3200 50 160 8000
Zhang 135 160 21600 150 160 24000
X. Du 225 160 36000 300 160 48000
E.G. 400 160 64000 500 160 80000
5.2. Memory Cost. This section presents a comparison of the
memory cost of the proposed scheme with some well-known
existing key management schemes for HSNs.
In an ECC-based key management scheme [2], the total
memory overhead is (𝑛MN + 3) ∗ 𝑛FN + 2𝑛MN, where 𝑛MN and
𝑛FN are the numbers ofMNs and FNs, respectively (as derived
in [26]). Instead, in the solution presented by Yang et al. [20],
each FN is preloaded with a pair of public/private keys and
𝑛FN − 1 distinct pairwise keys, while no key is preloaded in
the MNs. The memory overhead of this scheme is (2 + 𝑛FN −
1) ∗ 𝑛FN. According to the basic scheme [10], each node is
loadedwith 𝑞 keys before deployment, thus resulting in a total
memory overhead of 𝑞 ∗ (𝑛FN + 𝑛MN).
In the scheme proposed in this paper, each MN is
loaded with only 3 keys (i.e., SK, 𝐾plc, and 𝐾auth) and each
FN is loaded with 6 keys (i.e., the BS public key, its own
public/private key pair, SKG, CNDK, and𝐾prt). The resulting
memory overhead is 6𝑛FN + 3𝑛MN.
To analyze and compare the proposed scheme with the
existing schemes [2, 10, 14, 15, 20], it is assumed that each
FN is able to make a maximum of 𝑑 connections with its
neighboring MNs. According to [10, 14, 15], if a node has𝑁
𝑐
neighbors and that node has to establish secure links with
only 𝑑 neighbors, then the required key sharing probability
should be
Pr = 𝑑
𝑁
𝑐
. (6)
For example, the single key sharing probability required
to make 30 connections with the neighboring MNs out of 38
neighbors is approximately 0.80. From Table 3, each node in
[10] should carry 400 keys and each FN in [14] should carry
700 keys while each MN should carry 228 keys while in [15]
each FN should carry 250 keys and each MN should carry 30
keys. In our scheme, each FN should be loaded with only 6
secret keys.
Table 3 summarizes the performance offered by different
solutions in terms of the total number of the keys deployed
for different sizes of the WSN. The results show that the
proposed scheme requires definitely fewer keys compared to
other approaches, especially in case dense networks are taken
into consideration. For less dense networks, the proposed
scheme and Yang’s scheme require almost the same number
of keys.
Since Zhang et al. [30] have presented the perturbation-
based key establishment scheme for secure communica-
tion, its computational complexity and memory requirement
increase with the increase in polynomial degree “𝑡.” Since
each node is assigned a number of polynomials based on
the required size of secret key and unaffected bits in per-
turbated polynomials, it increases the storage requirements
exponentially. Also the receiver needs to find three different
keys from the assigned perturbated polynomials in order to
pick the correct one for the secure communication. However
this approach increases the computational cost when key
is combination of more than one perturbated polynomial.
In our proposed scheme, we only need to assign few keys
(shown in Table 3) for secret key establishment and secure
communication.
Yu [34] proposed noninteractive pairwise key estab-
lishment schemes called constrained random perturbation-
based pairwise key establishment (CARPY) and CARPY+
for secure communication. Although this scheme generates
less commutation and communication overhead compared
to [30], still it has large computation overhead compared to
the proposed scheme. It is the improved version of Blom’s
scheme based on the concept of matrix perturbation. Only
𝑙 − 𝑟 bits are used to construct secret key from different
matrix polynomials where 𝑙 is theminimumnumber of bits to
represent an element in field𝐹
𝑞
and 𝑟 is the least bit perturbed.
If 𝐿 is the length of secret key, then [𝐿/(𝑙 − 𝑟)] rounds are
required to generate a key, which reflect the computation cost
of this approach.This approach is alsomemory expensive one
to store large matrix for key establishment compared to the
proposed approach.
5.3. Network Resilience to Node Compromised Attacks. This
section shows the effect of node compromised attacks on
data communication capabilities. In the proposed scheme,
FNs and MNs are provided with different security measures
dealing with such attacks. Since FNs act as both CHs and
data sinks for MNs, they are provided with tamper-resistant
hardware to protect their security material [35]. Once the
FN is captured, all its security keys are replaced by a
reference “compromised key” which neither allow the node
to authenticate itself to the BS nor accept any joining MN.
On the contrary, we assume that for cost reasons theMNs are
not provided with the tamper-resistant hardware.
Node compromised attacks have a significant impact on
the security offered by the communication links operating
within the network in case of balanced and unbalanced
key predistribution schemes for homogeneous and hetero-
geneous sensor networks due to the large number of shared
keys with other nodes in the network. The fraction of
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Figure 6: Fraction of communication compromised by capturing
“𝑛” mobile nodes (MNs).
communications compromised by compromising “𝑛”MNs in
shared key predistribution schemes is given by
Pr [Compromised] = 1 − (1 − 𝐾
𝑃
)
𝑛
, (7)
where 𝐾 is the number of keys assigned to each MN from a
pool of 𝑃 keys. In case of compromised FNs, 𝐾 is replaced
by 𝑆 in (7). Figure 6 shows the OMNET++ simulation results
about how many communications links a compromised MN
can create with uncompromised MNs without involving the
CH/FN. More specifically, the figure compares the proposed
scheme with the schemes proposed in [10, 14, 15, 19] with
Pr[Conn] = 0.8. The proposed scheme performs better
because (i) a MN cannot establish directly a communication
linkwith the otherMNs of the network and (ii) all the FNs use
the algorithm proposed in [29] to detect the compromised
MNs.
Since the FNs act as trusted servers to the MNs, their
compromise can severely affect the network security. Figure 7
shows a comparison among the OMNET++ simulation
results for the FNs compromise in the proposed scheme and
in other reference solutions, that is, [10, 14, 19]. It is clear
from Figure 7 that FN compromise results in almost the same
number of compromised links when using [10, 14]. Although
[19] proposed a balanced key distribution for the HSNs like
[10] for homogeneous sensor networks, it performs better
than [10, 14] because it divides the key pool 𝑃 into a number
of groups equal to the number of clusters, thus increasing not
only network connectivity but also network resilience against
both FN and MN capture attacks.
5.4. Communication Overhead. In this section, the commu-
nication overhead is evaluated also analyzing the different
contributions from the authentication and key establishment
phases. The simulation scenario is kept constant, with 16 FNs
and 500MNs.
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Figure 8: Authentication overhead.
5.4.1. Authentication Overhead. Concerning the authentica-
tion overhead, the total number of packets exchanged during
the authentication phase is considered. The authentication
phase of the proposed solution is compared with some of
the existing approaches including [21, 22, 26]. OMNET++
simulation results show that the proposed scheme produces
less authentication overhead than the existing schemes, as
shown in Figure 8.
5.4.2. Key Establishment Overhead. As far as key estab-
lishment overhead is concerned, the proposed solution is
compared with basic homogeneous [10] and heterogeneous
[14, 26] schemes. The results show a significant reduction of
the communication overhead. A 99% network connectivity
probability for [10, 14] was taken into account computing
the number of keys required in each FN and MN (using
the results of (3) and (4)). The obtained results are shown
in Figure 9. There is only a slight difference in terms of
communication overhead between the homogeneous and
heterogeneous approaches, but there is a big difference in
terms of memory cost (Table 3).
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5.4.3. Total Initialization Phase Overhead. This section
presents the OMNET++ simulation results for the total
communication overhead generated during the first authen-
tication and key establishment phase. The results of the
proposed scheme have been compared with the ones related
to [21, 26], since both solutions are based on the mutual
authentication and key establishment phases. Figure 10 rep-
resents the resulting communication overhead by varying the
size of the network.
5.5. Energy Consumption. This section describes the average
energy consumption of each node during the authentication
and initialization phases of the network (again using the
OMNET++ simulator). The proposed solution requires only
2 messages for the authentications as shown in Figure 8,
compared with [22] which requires 4 messages and with
[21, 26] which require 3 messages for authentication.
Figure 10 also shows the effectiveness of combining the
authentication and key establishment phases to reduce the
total overhead during the initialization phase. Such opti-
mization results in power savings at each node and in an
overall increase of the network lifetime. Figure 11 represents
the OMNET++ results for the average energy consumption
of each node during the initialization phase (authentication
and key establishment) in the proposed scheme, as compared
with [21, 26]. The results show that the proposed solution
by combining the authentication and key establishment
messages actually reduces the energy consumption with
respect to [21, 26] where separate messages are exchanged
for key establishment between the nodes after their successful
authentication.
5.6. Overhead Generated during Handover. We have also
analyzed the proposed scheme using OMNET++ simulator
to check overhead generated during the handover phase.
Figure 12 shows the comparison of the average number of
messages exchanged to select the new CH and leave the old
CH while Figure 13 shows the average overhead generated
during this phase. We analyzed the network having 10 nodes
and 50 nodes and keeping the node’s speed of 1mps, 5mps,
and 10mps.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a key management scheme is proposed for
cluster-based heterogeneous sensor networks. In comparison
with existing approaches, the proposed solution provides
better network connectivity, reduces memory overhead,
increases network resilience against node capture attacks,
and requires minimum communication overhead during the
authentication and key establishment phases. Hence it saves
battery energy and increases the network lifetime. Also the
security of the proposed scheme has been analyzed using
the AVISPA tool against well-known attacks. In this paper,
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only intranetwork movements of the mobile nodes were
considered. Future work will analyze internetworks mobility
scenarios.
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